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The purpose of this research paper is to develop general methods to represent the use
of Special Operations Forces (SOF) for strategic objectives, based on a stochastic wargame
simulation, and to integrate the representation into the Joint Warfare Analysis Experimental
Prototype (JWAEP) Model. This thesis applies some analytical models as an instrument to
decide the cause and effect relationships 'before' and 'after* the Special Forces have been used.
The relationships of interest include: how targets for SOF can be estimated; how much time
is needed to infiltrate to the target; the probability of approach; the damage rate to the target;
and the measures of effectiveness for those inputs.
The general approach requires the development of unique mathematical models for
analysis in simulations.
The current JWAEP model does not represent the effect of Special Forces through
any analytical model. However, in this new era of warfare, target-oriented means of attack
such as nuclear weapons, chemical and bio-weapons, and special forces are increasing in
importance. SOF can be very efficient in conducting surprise attack for operational and
strategic objectives. Based on the Korean war scenario and JWAEP, this thesis addresses the
following:
• What are the strategic and operational targets for SOF? What is the model for
selection of targets for SOF?
• How can I model the events occurring during ingress of SOF to a target, with the
associated probabilities of success?
• How can I model the probability that a SOF will succeed in its mission, given that
it reached its target successfully?
• What are the effects on theater operations (as represented in JWAEP) of successful
or unsuccessful missions?
• What is the optimal way to protect strategic targets against SOF?
• How can I detect enemy's SOF during ingress to their targets?
xv
• What are the best locations for security units to protect SOF targets and to defeat
the enemy as they approach?
The first model is the Target model which selects the Special Operations Force (SOF)
targets and optimal routes into the target theater. The second model is the Ingress model
which represents the spatial shift of a Special Operations Force to the target area based on
probability theory. The third model, which is divided into two parts, infiltration and combat,
represents the process of attrition at the target.
These three models are used in series to represent the complete SOF operation. An
example and initial test ofthe models is a possible Korean scenario. Finally, recommendations
for future improvements to the SOF models and JWAEP are presented.
xvi
I. INTRODUCTION
A. PURPOSE OF THESIS
The purpose of this research paper is to develop general methods to represent the use
of Special Operations Forces (SOF) for strategic objectives, based on a stochastic wargame
simulation, and to integrate the representation into the Joint Warfare Analysis Experimental
Prototype (JWAEP) Model. This thesis applies some analytical models as an instrument to
decide the cause and effect relationships 'before' and 'after1 the Special Forces have been used.
The relationships of interest include: how targets for SOF can be estimated; how much time
is needed to infiltrate to the target; the probability of approach; the damage rate to the target;
and the measures of effectiveness for those inputs.
The general approach requires the development of unique mathematical models for
analysis in simulations.
B. BACKGROUND AND HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
As modern weapon systems develop very fast, they introduce the features of great
lethality into war. For example, the invasion of Iraq and Kuwait illustrated the importance
of the surprise attack by maneuver. Desert Storm showed a mix of air-land battle doctrine
and high technology. Thus, modern warfare goes from attrition warfare to paralysis warfare,
based on high technology and the surprise attack.
On the basis of these view-points, the Gulf War documented the emergence of a
challenging new era for conventional warfare. The effect of high technology has
revolutionized the nature of war.
Partly due to the reach and accuracy ofmodern deep-strike weapons, military thinkers
have begun to argue that future battlefields will look very different from those ofWorld War
II. In the future, vast slow-moving military forces deployed along well-known front lines will
be vulnerable to attacks by smart weapons launched from tens or even hundreds of miles away
or dropped by attacking aircraft. As a result, modern armies are looking at concepts of non-
linear warfare in which smaller, fast moving, more independent units maneuver around a
battlefield, coalesce to attack enemy formations, then melt away into a smaller component
parts less vulnerable to smart weapons. As in war at sea, the focus will be not so much on
seizing territory as on destroying enemy combat forces or paralyzing their function.
Thus, coalition forces in Desert Storm showed modern warfare by executing a
deception before ground operations began, by the exploitation of space systems, the use of
battle management system to coordinate the on-going battle, the use of aircraft for command
and control, the use of special forces to disrupt an Iraq's rear area, the employment of
airmobile troops to establish strong points well behind the front line, devastating armored
thrusts conducted by all-arms maneuver groups, and by the achievement of air superiority and
use of air strikes to neutralize enemy movements.
But there is another aspect to war. Although technology is a critical component in
modern warfare, high technology weapons and military systems are useless in the abstract.
A well-trained, professional military, capable of using technology and in service of an
appropriate strategy, will continue to win wars. In other words, high technology weapons
and systems can win wars only when deployed and operated in the proper context of military
effort, trained people, and sound strategy. [Ref 1]
In view ofthe two considerations, high technology and human factors, it is predicted
that crucial, important objectives will be attacked by high-tech weapons, Tactical Air, SOF
and their combination. Since high-tech weapons and air attack can be detected by the
opponents' high-tech sensors, SOF is a very efficient weapon for a surprise attack.
C. PROBLEM STATEMENT
The current JWAEP model does not represent the effect of Special Forces through
any analytical model. However, in this new era of warfare, target-oriented means of attack
such as nuclear weapons, chemical and bio-weapons, and special forces are increasing in
importance. SOF can be very efficient in conducting surprise attack for operational and
strategic objectives. Based on the Korean war scenario and JWAEP:
• What are the strategic and operational targets for SOF? What is the model for
selection of targets for SOF?
• How can I model the events occurring during ingress of SOF to a target, with the
associated probabilities of success?
• How can I model the probability that a SOF will succeed in its mission, given that
it reached its target successfully?
• What are the effects on theater operations (as represented in JWAEP) of successful
or unsuccessful missions?
• What is the optimal way to protect strategic targets against SOF?
• How can I detect enemy's SOF during ingress to their targets?
• What are the best locations for security units to protect SOF targets and to defeat
the enemy as they approach?
D. THESIS FORMAT
The purpose and historical background of this thesis are presented in Chapter I.
Chapter II discusses the motivation and overview of SOF, the structure ofJWAEP
and analysis factors of strategic and operational events.
Chapter JJI provides the SOF Target Model, and methodology for solving problems
in target analysis. The problem is decomposed into target selection and optimal route
selection. The CARVER model with six factors and Dijkstra's algorithm are used. Data are
derived from the scenario of a possible Korean war based on a three phased Korean
contingency.
Chapter IV treats the SOF Ingress Model. The basic concept of this model is an
analytical process based on Binomial events.
The combat model is presented in Chapter V. It models the events on the target area
between SOF and the target's security units. This is divided into two parts: infiltration and
attrition. Lanchester's theory of attrition is used.
In Chapter VI, the three SOF models are applied to a Korean war scenario and
analyzed. These results are the basic data for checking the effects of SOF in theater-level
warfare.
Chapter VII provides the conclusion and recommendations for future research related
to Korean situations.
n. LITERATURE AND RELEVANT FACTORS
A. MOTIVATIONS
1. Changes of World Order
When there were two superpower countries, the Soviet Union and the U.S.A., most
third world countries were aligned with one power or the other. These alliances with one
superpower or the other guaranteed the military security of a third world country from a
threat posed by the other. However, after the disintegration of the Soviet Union, there is no
axis of equilibrium in military power. The U.S.A. wants to preserve itself as the sole
superpower country. Thus, countries with powerful economies, e.g., Japan, France, and
Germany, have increased their initiatives on the international stage, and third world countries
have declared their roles and interests. Thus, countries that had aligned themselves with the
Soviets now have the tendency to employ their military power. This tendency increases the
possibility of regional conflicts in Northeast Asia (containing North Korea).
2. Instability of Korean Peninsula
The Korean peninsula faces an increasing possibility of a second Korean war at the
present time. The Korean peninsula is one of the most militarized areas in the world. Not
only has North Korea fortified the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) with extensive underground
facilities, but also over 65 percent of its active ground forces are positioned between
Pyongyang and the DMZ. Naval patrols and artillery provide heavy coastal protection.
North Korea claims the coastal defense zone, and sometimes enforces this claim by capturing
Japanese and South Korean fishing vessels. Military and military production facilities are
well-protected, camouflaged, or underground. Aircraft, air-defense artillery, and surface-to-
air missiles provide overlapping, in-depth air defense for forces and facilities. But, the most
important point is that in addition to this preoccupation with defense, it is developing the
capability to launch an independent surprise attack against South Korea. North Korea
repeatedly proclaims its right and duty to liberate' South Korea. IfPyongyang perceives that
the right conditions exist, it will use its forces to unify the peninsula. North Korea could
maximize its tactical advantage by launching a surprise attack supported by mobile forces.
Drawing forces from four frontline corps supported by artillery and armored units, the initial
attack will try to penetrate defense lines, cut off withdrawal routes and create an opening for
mechanized and armored exploitation forces to press the attack. According to North Korea
Army defectors, Pyongyang will try to neutralize the bulk of friendly troops positioned near
the DMZ, derail the South's mobilization and American augmentation efforts, isolate Seoul,
and begin negotiations, all within seven days. Any North Korean offensive will emphasize
surprise, mobility, firepower, and possible chemical warfare. Especially before the main
infantry attack, artillery groups would launch surface-to-surface missile and fire long-range
guns along the front and Special Operations Forces would attack the strategic objectives of
South Korea to frustrate their functions. In wartime, some of the nearly 60,000 military
personnel assigned to the 22 Special Operations Forces brigades and seven Light Infantry
Reconnaissance battalions would be available to open a second front in South Korea's rear
area.
During offensive operations, corps reconnaissance units would conduct penetration
missions to collect military intelligence and launch raids on military and civilian targets. Some
units would infiltrate behind allied lines by land and sea, while others would cross into South
Korea before the main attack through tunnels under the Demilitarized Zone. These units
would penetrate at night to locate and destroy command posts, destroy lines of
communication, create confusion in rear areas, interdict troop and supply convoys, attack
military installations, and gain control of critical terrain. [Ref. 3]
3. Existing Models for High-Level Warfare
There are several theater models in existence today. The primary models in use are
the Tactical Warfare model (TACWAR) [Ref 4] and the Concepts Evaluation Model (CEM).
Other theater-level models are JTLS, FORCEM, RSAS, and RESA [Ref. 6] Table 1 depicts
the development history and representation capabilities of these models.
a. JTLS (Joint Theater Level Simulation)
This model was first developed in 1983-84 for a group consisting of the Joint
U.S. Readiness Command, the Army War College and the U. S. Army Concepts Analysis
Agency. JTLS is a stochastic, real time player interactive simulation of Joint Theater combat.
The basic ground maneuver unit in JTLS is a division or sometimes an independent brigade.
Each division maintains a heterogenous list of combatants by weapon system type. The air
model basic entity is an air mission with a heterogeneous representation of the individual
aircraft types involved and a detailed simulation of the progress of the mission against a
specific target unit or location. Currently a means to depict the process of SOF combat is
under development.
b. CEM (Concepts Evaluation Model)
This is a deterministic theater model ofground and air combat which has been
upgraded through several versions since 1974 and is currently maintained by the U.S. Army
Concepts Analysis Agency. This is an analytical model used primarily to analyze force
effectiveness in theater-level warfare. It is designed to assess the effectiveness of different
mixes of forces and resources and to estimate ammunition, equipment and personnel
requirement.
c. RSAS (Rand Strategy Assessment System)
This model was developed in 1988 by RAND Corporation. RSAS provides
a laboratory for the analysis of military strategy and operations in which alternative strategies
and operations are evaluated in terms of the robustness of outcomes across the inherent range
of uncertainty in scenarios, performance factors, and rules of war. It can also be used for
training and other requirements.
d TACWAR
This is a theater level combat model that examines the interaction of strategic
and tactical forces in a conventional or chemical environment. It is intended to model the
forces involved in a conflict at the brigade/regimental level or higher. The model allows an
analytical group to examine alternative courses of action considered in the development of
operational war plans and support an operational command group in the conduct of exercises
or prosecution of real world contingencies. TACWAR operates as a completely automated
deterministic model and consists of a series of submodels covering air, ground and logistics
operations, as well as operations in a chemical environment.
Model Vintage Proponent
Parts
ReferenceGround Air Sea SOF
JTLS 1983's CAA, USRC o A Interactive
CEM 1970's CAA o
RSAS 1988's RAND o Strategic





Legend: o = Represented in model




e. RESA (Research, Evaluation and Systems Analysis Facility)
This model is a research and evaluation tool for systems analysis and testing
associated with naval command control and communications systems. It is also used for
operation plan evaluation, command and control training support for senior officers, joint C3
interoperability assessment, warfare systems architecture analysis and wargaming support.
[Ref 5]
4. Why SOF?
The activity of SOF is the same as that of common combat, but its results can affect
theater-level operations. This is the reason SOF is referred to as a strategic or operational
force.
At present, there are lots of theater-level models that treat the relationship between
high-level units and campaign execution, but most of them treat the effects of conventional
warfare without SOF activity.
Special Force Operations often are employable where high-profile conventional forces
appear to be politically, militarily, or economically inappropriate. Small, self-reliant, readily
deployable units that capitalize on speed, surprise, audacity, and deception may sometimes
accomplish missions in ways that minimize the risks of escalation and concurrently maximize
returns compared with orthodox applications of military power, which normally emphasize
mass. Aircraft, artillery, or combat engineers, for example, might demolish a critical bridge
at a particular time, but SOF could magnify the effects on the bridge while a train load of
enemy dignitaries or ammunition was halfway across. Conventional land, sea, and air forces
normally patrol specified sectors intermittently, whereas special reconnaissance troops may
remain in hostile territory for weeks or months at a time collecting information that otherwise
would be unobtainable. So, if an analytical model for SOF is designed and implemented in
a current model, it will assist in the analysis of theater-level warfare. [Ref. 7]
B. OVERVIEW OF SOF
At the present, research for special operations connected with theater-level combat
simulations cannot be found, so it is critical to study this area from the view-point ofjoint
theater level warfare.
1. Definition of Special Force Operations
From the US dictionary for military terminology, special force operations is defined
as:
Military operations conducted by specially trained, equipped, and organized
DOD forces against strategic or tactical targets in pursuit of national military,
political, economic, or psychological objectives. They may support
conventional military operations, or they may be prosecuted independently
when the use of conventional forces is either inappropriate or infeasible.
Sensitive peacetime operations, except for training , are normally authorized
by the National Command Authority (NCA) and conducted under the
direction of the NCA or designated commander. Special operations may
include unconventional warfare, counter-terrorist operations, collective
security and civil affairs measures.
2. Role of Special Operations Forces (SOF) in War
In a limited or general war, SOF can perform its missions at the strategic, operational,
or tactical level to influence deep, close, or rear operations. However, the primary role of
SOF is to conduct and support deep operations beyond the forward limits of conventional
military forces. [Ref 13]






3. Structure and Ability of North Korea's SOF
North Korea's SOF are organized into 22 brigades and seven independent battalions.
These forces have five missions: conducting reconnaissance, performing combat operations
in concert with conventional operations, establishing a second front in the South Korea's rear
area, countering South Korea's SOF in North Korea's rear areas, and maintaining internal
security.
The Ministry of the People's Armed Forces has two primary commands that control
special operations units - the Reconnaissance Bureau and the Light Infantry Training
Guidance Bureau.
The North Korean Air force supports SOF with airborne infiltration and supply
operations. The primary aircraft are 250 An-2/COLTs. The North Korean Navy support
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amphibious operations and sea infiltrations. The principal vessel is the NAMPO personnel
landing craft. Minisubmarines and semisubmersible insertion landing craft support agent
missions.
North Korea SOFs have missions at the strategic, operational and tactical levels.
The strategic mission ascertains the South's intentions, develops target information and
attacks critical nodes, such as C 3I facilities, storage facility air and air defense systems, in
addition to kidnaping or interrogation of key personnel
.
The operational mission is to support corps objectives, attacking weapon delivery
systems, and attack major lines of communication.
The tactical mission is to support maneuver of division and brigade objectives. The
size of SOF is usually from company to battalions. Its mission is to destroy command posts,
air defense sites or force concentrations such as artillery positions, line of communication, or
reserve troop areas. [Ref 3]
C. REQUIREMENTS FOR A MODERN ANALYTICAL APPROACH
The analytical approach used should be appropriate for the time and situation. An
analytical approach must reflect the significant differences between the theater-level and
tactical level of warfare.
An example of this is found in military movement rates. An individual tank can run
at 60 kilometers per hour (k/h) for an extended period of time. A tank company can move at
about 25 k/h for most of a day. A tank division can move at most 5 or 7 k/h sustained over
a day. This is an example of the discontinuity between levels of warfare. When we think
about an analytical approach for theater level modeling, we need to consider four points.
First, the aggregation of several factors is needed. Second, the analysis needs to focus on
strategic and operational events, variations, and uncertainties. Simple linear scenarios that
suggest a best estimate of the course of combat will almost always be wrong because they
ignore the elements of surprise - a very important factor in modern doctrine. Third, the
analysis needs to develop new procedures for presenting the uncertainties of combat to
decision-makers and making these uncertainties more comprehensible. Special operations
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forces and interdiction against logistics may be hard to model but may have important effects
on battles and campaigns. Fourth, an analysis needs to adopt a new approach of developing
simple but more comprehensive models; trade-offs between inputs and key assumptions can
be adjusted to reflect the impact of the variations of the warfare [Ref. 9]. In view ofthese
factors, the campaign in Korea, assuming a North Korean offensive, will be considered.
Figure 1 shows a simplified series of operational events. These events can be divided into
three parts [Appendix C].
Figure 1
.
Operational Events in Korea Campaign
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In this series of events, the most important event is the outcome of the first
operational phase: whether the ROK forward ground defense fails or not. For this phase,
North Korea will use artillery, tactical air and SOF. Among these methods, SOF is very
efficient for destroying the functionality of strategic targets. Thus, the modeling of SOF is
necessary, based on these requirements for an analytical approach.
D. STRUCTURE OF JOINT WARFARE ANALYSIS EXPERIMENT PROTOTYPE
(JWAEP)
The JWAEP is a symbolic prototype model characterized by its aggregated,
stochastic, information-intensive and dynamic nature. It is an interactive, two-sided, theater
level combat model based on an arc-node representation of ground, air and littoral combat.
The level of detail used in the model is appropriate for battalion to brigade-sized maneuver
units, flight groups, and major combatant vessels. JWAEP is the software prototype
developed by the Naval Postgraduate School for research and experimentation into stochastic
and C3I centered approaches to modeling theater-level combat. A simulation solution method
is suited for models in which relationships are expressed procedurally in the form of decision
rules instead of algebraic formulas. A simulation of a symbolic model is obtained by
sequentially acting out the processes and interactions ofthe model. [Ref 10]
An analytic solution method uses an explicit mathematical formula for each output
variable, which is itselfa function of input variables. Analytical solution methods are desirable
model designs because the input and output relationships are displayed in the explicit formula,
which can be explained to gain a perspective about the model's performance and operations.
Furthermore, sensitivity analysis that varies input parameters can be easily conducted on
output variables. [Ref. 11]
1. Interactive Active Command & Control and Perception
The current JWAEP supports C 3I through the presentation of a perception (derived
from sensors) to a man-in-the-loop decision maker. The decisions can be stored in a data
base to do non-interactive stochastic replications for analysis and "what - if exploration.
Decision rules are under development to permit complete non-interactive simulation. The key
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to the model's C 3I representation lies in the assignment of sensors to units, parts of the
network, and footprints assigned to the terrain to develop separate stochastic perceptions of
ground truth for Red and Blue players.
2. Ground Warfare
Ground warfare is executed upon a node-arc representation of key terrain, objectives,
defensive points, and maneuver corridors. Units have full freedom to move anywhere on the
network that they perceive at movement rates appropriate to the type and size of the unit and
type of terrain. Thus, any type of maneuver warfare can be simulated on the network. Unit
movement paths can be stated exactly or left to an automated path selection algorithm that
chooses the "least cost path" where the cost function is also designated by the user.
3. Air Warfare
The air within a theater of operations is divided into a grid: each grid square
represents the volume of air from ground up within the geographic area enclosed by a square.
Air-to-air engagements are fought when aircraft encounter each other within a grid square;
surface-to-air and air-to-surface engagements are fought between flights within an air grid and
any ground targets or weapon systems on the terrain underlying the grid. Each grid square
appears to the model as a node, with direct connectivity to eight adjacent squares (nodes);
thus aircraft also choose a "least cost path" through a network to move to an engagement/
target area and return.
4. Littoral Warfare
Littoral warfare is currently under development. A limited littoral warfare
representation can be made by defining carriers as air bases on water nodes and Marine
amphibious units as ground units that can move over water nodes and arcs that connect to the




Targeting is the process of selecting targets and matching the appropriate response
to them, taking into account operational requirements and capabilities. Due to the combined
nature of warfighting in some theaters, the targeting process varies from theater to theater.
The method proposed in this thesis is generic, representing one way Special Operations Force
(SOF) targeting can be executed. SOF targeting, like conventional targeting, combines
intelligence and operations. It represents the integration of intelligence, threat information,
the target system, and target characteristics with operational data on friendly force posture,
capabilities, weapon effects, objectives, rules of engagement, and doctrine. Targeting
matches objectives and guidance with inputs from intelligence and operations to identify the
forces necessary to achieve the mission. Targeting support to SOF is unique because SO
missions require detailed planning and are dependent upon precise intelligence.
B. TARGETING ANALYSIS
Targeting analysis is a unique subset of operational planning. Both activities focus on
objectives but in different ways. In an abstract sense, the objective of operational planning
is the aim or end of any actions; its substance is drawn from the mission statement of the
supported commander. Target analysis concentrates on the focal points of the planned
military action in an operation. Therefore, target analysis deals with objectives in the concrete
sense (i.e., physical objects whose presence and location dominate the attention of the forces
involved).
Target analysis is defined as the examination of potential targets to determine their
military importance, priority of attack, scale of effort, and weapons required to obtain a
desired level of damage or casualties. Analysis is performed to determine enemy
vulnerabilities that can be exploited. It also determines what effects will likely be achieved
against the target system and their activities. Table 2 shows the grouping of possible targets
and their components.
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Kind of Target Sub-Target Character Suitable Attack Instruments
SOF Missile Artillery Aircraft
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Legend: o = optimal A = acceptable
Table 2. Group of Possible Targets and Their Components
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The functions and interactions between components and elements of the target system
are essential to determine how the system works, focusing on what effects are likely to be
achieved by attacking forces, where the system must be attacked, and how many forces
should be sent.
In the United States, the focal point of target planning for conventional and SOF
operations is the Joint Targeting Coordination Board (JTCB) of the theater CINC. Target
analysis requires all-source intelligence with a high degree of topographic detail. This high-
echelon, theater- level activity is appropriate to the task of orchestrating national, theater, and
service intelligence production agencies and compelling all-source intelligence to support the





















Figure 2. Joint Targeting Coordination Board (JTCB)
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C. CONCEPT OF THE TARGETING MODEL
This model is divided into two parts: selecting targets and selecting optimal routes.
Planners or commanders of special operations should sharpen their assessment of the
suitability, feasibility, and acceptability of undertaking a special operation against a target by
answering the following questions:
• Will destruction or neutralizations of the target contribute to the SOF mission or
to the mission of the conventional commander?
• Is attack by SOF feasible?
• Is the target vulnerable to the level of destructive force that the SOF can apply?
• Is the expected damage to the target commensurate with the level of risk to SOF?
• Are other means of attack available?
• What is the possibility of compromise of conventional operational plans?
• What coordination will be required between SOF and the conventional force
commander?
Therefore, the six factors to be considered are: criticality, accessibility, recuperability,
vulnerability, effect, and recognizability (CARVER). In order to evaluate and assign a
numerical value to the relative attractiveness of striking a target under consideration, a matrix
is used in which the columns represent the individual headings of the acronym and the rows
identify physical objectives such as individual targets or types of targets. A value of one to
five is assigned for low to high attractiveness. [Ref 12, pp. 54 - 59]
Table 3 shows the CARVER rating scale matrix. The definitions of the CARVER
elements are:
C= Criticality: A target is critical when its destruction or damage will have a
significant influence upon the enemy's ability to conduct or support its operations. Each
target is considered in relation to other elements of the system or complex nominated or
designated for attack. Criticality changes with the wartime situation.
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A= Accessibility: A target is accessible when an action element can infiltrate the
target area either by physical action or by direct or indirect fire weapons.
R= Recuperability: A target's recuperability is measured by time, i.e., how long it will
take to replace, repair, or bypass the destruction or damage and return the system or complex
to normal operational capacity.
V= Vulnerability: A target is vulnerable if the action element had the means and
expertise to successfully attack and destroy the target
E= Effect: An effective target will have significant political, economic, and
sociological impact if attacked. Enemy reprisals against local citizens must be considered.
R= Recognizability: Can the target or target component be identified by the action
element in all types of weather, day or night?
VALUE C A R V E R
5
Loss would be t Easily accessible Extremely difficult SOF definitely has Favorable Easily recognized
mission stopper Away from to replace Long the means and sociological by d with no
security down nme(>lyi) expertise to attack unpad Impact on
aviians OK
confusion.
4 Loss would reduce Easily accessible. Difficult to replace SOF probably has Favorable impact
,
Easily recognized
mission outside with long down the means and no adverse impact by most withbtde
performance tmie<<I yi) expertise on civilians confusion
greatly
3
Loss would reduce Accessible Can be replaced m SOF may have the Favorable impact. Recognized with
mission a relatively short means and some adverse some training
performance am ei months) expertise to attack impact on crvuians
2
Loss may reduce Difficult to gam Easily replaced m • SOF probably has No impact Hard to recognize





Loss would not Very difficult to Easily replaced m a SOF does not have Unfavorable Extremely difficult
affect mission gam access short timeidays
)
much capability to impact Assured to recognize




Table 3. CARVER Value Rating Scale Matrix
We can apply the CARVER matrix (Table 3) this to possible targets, as shown in Table 4.
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TARGETS C A R V E R TOTAL
POWER PYLONS 4 5 3 5 3 5 25
RUNWAYS 5 4 1 3 4 5 22
CABLE SYSTEM 5 4 4 4 5 4 26
UNDERGROUND
CABLES
4 5 4 5 5 4 27
OBSERVATIONS
TOWERS
3 3 3 5 4 5 23
COMMAND POST
BLDG
5 3 3 4 5 4 24
SHIPS AT PIER 4 4 5 5 5 2 25
WAREHOUSES 2 5 3 5 5 4 24
ROAD & BRIDGE 3 4 2 5 3 5 22
MOBILE SAM SITE 3 1 3 3 5 2 17
FIXED SAM SITE 3 2 3 3 5 2 18
ANTENNA FARM 4 5 3 5 5 4 26
PERSONNEL 3 1 2 1 4 1 12
Table 4. Sample CARVER Matrix Application
In Table 4, we compare the total value of each target and choose the higher values,
which become possible targets for SOF or other attack instruments. After this process, we
determine the optimal route to these targets.
D. OPTIMAL ROUTING SELECTION
The basic concept of this process is the shortest path algorithm The length of an arc
(distance) is the basis of SOF's route to a target and can be counted as the value of the arc.
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SOF will also use important features and topographical points as landmarks for keeping its
direction; they may be included in a SOF path.
Thus, in a directed network G = (N
,
A) with an arc length X$ associated with each
arc (i, j) that belongs to A, the network has a node S, which is the starting point for a SO
force. The length of a directed path is defined as the sum of the lengths of arcs in the path.
The shortest path algorithm determines the shortest length directed path from node S to node
i, at which a SOF target is located.
E. NETWORK RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE TARGETING MODEL AND
JWAEP
The current ground network in JWAEP has physical nodes and arcs. The physical
nodes are primarily located at intersections of avenues of approach and lines of
communication. Other physical nodes are located at geographic points of interest, possible
key terrain, airbases, logistical bases, probable and actual defensive battle positions, and
terrain oriented objectives. [Ref 15]
The arcs which connect the physical nodes are assigned the attributes of the
corresponding terrain that lie between the nodal locations. One attribute is that of distance
between nodes, measured along the contours of the terrain rather than the straight line
distance. Other attributes are the road classification and width of the mobility corridor that
the arc runs along, and the terrain classification along the arc.
In a SOF model network, the nodes and arcs should be specific to the SOF movement.
At present, JWAEP's arcs are too long and the nodes are too large (they are resolved only to
the level necessary to represent brigade/regimental movement). In a Korean contingency,
possible strategic objectives and key terrain areas should be designated as nodes for SOF. In
this SOF targeting model, the South Korean area is divided into three parts by the phase of
the conventional warfare campaign. Phase I consists of 65 nodes for key terrain and
objectives. The arcs in this model are the possible routes for SOF ingress. They closely
follow an existing JWAEP arc but are more resolved. The arcs between nodes contain the
attributes of distance, contours of the terrain, the level of forestation and the classification of
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road and width ofthe mobility corridor. This special network for SOF movement is included




In the real world, ingress represents the spatial shift of combat power, which includes
the ground, air, sea and possibly combined operations, in accordance with decisions and plans.
Traditionally, ingress is considered as the shift of modeled units from one set of coordinates
to another. In this thesis, ingress considers the interactions between moving units and their
environment (e.g., the effects of terrain, weather, security level, etc). In addition, this ingress
model will contain various decisions that units make endogenous to the model, based on
events or interactions that may take place during ingress. The movement is based on the
SOF network, part of the arc-node representation in the JWAEP simulation system.
For SOF, ingress represents the spatial shift of combat power without the enemy's
notice. This supports the intent of special force operations (surprise attack). Therefore, a
decision will occur at every physical node, whether the SOF operation continues or not,
based on whether detection has occurred or may occur. This makes it possible to model the
"Go/No Go" decision and to estimate the possibility of successful shift of combat power using
probability theory.
B. CONCEPTS OF THE INGRESS MODEL
Special Operations planners and executers are both concerned with the target priority,
anticipated security level, terrain and weather during a mission. In the targeting model, the
CARVER matrix can provide the target selection and network theory can solve for the
optimal route to the target. In the ingress model, the possibility of a shift of combat power
to the target is determined by using an exponential distribution for detection within a Monte
Carlo simulation. [Ref 17] When deciding upon the target, the SOF commander should
consider the possibility of detection by the enemy, the condition of the terrain, the size of
mission team, the weather, the type of mission area, possible reactions to SOF detection by
inhabitants, and required time. However, the sheer number of combatants and weapons
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system makes it impossible to maintain individual item resolution in the model. Models at the
operational level have to sacrifice detail for scope by aggregating small units into larger units.
This process of aggregation keeps the Ingress model within the limits of computer size and
execution. The shift of combat power is simulated based on the assumption that events on
ingress can be represented stochastically.
As shown in Figure 3, decisions will occur at every node. If the SOF team is detected,
it returns to its base with 20% attrition of its combat power 1
,
using the same amount of time









Move to next Node
Return to Base
Return to Base
Figure 3. Decision Tree at each Node During Ingress [Ref. 18]
C. PROBABILITY OF INGRESS
As a unit moves between physical nodes, it is subject to detection by enemy sensors.
The detection of a unit triggers a series of events that may identify unit size, its course of
action (COA), etc. A possible detection can be thought of as originating from some type of
It is assumed here that the SOF team can break up and successfully exfiltrate without contact after detection.
The 20% attrition figure is arbitrary; a possible model extension may consider explicit modeling of attrition to a detected
force.
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sensor, such as a satellite overflights that dispatch other sensors (e.g., reconnaissance sorties,
long range patrols, or cavalry scouts).
Detections are dependent upon several factors. These factors include the amount of
cover and concealment available, the duration of time a unit is exposed to an opponent's
sensor, and random chance. Therefore, it can be expressed as:
Detection Rate = f { g(SO factors), h(enemy factors), k(environment factors)}
The relationship of the factors described above can be estimated from a high resolution
simulation. For this model, each factor is considered at several levels as shown in Table 5.









Table 5. The Representative Factors for Detection Rate
Example values for detection rates used to demonstrate the methodology are given in
Table 6.
The variables used to determine detections within the ingress model are defined as:
Ty : Transit time for a unit going from node i to node j.
Dy : Time to detect at least one unit going from node i to node j.
IL : Number of units transiting from node i to node j.
Ay : Detection rate for a single unit transiting from node i to node j.
R : Random number drawn from an Exponential distribution with mean equal
to one.
T- is modeled within JWAEP as a normally distributed random variable with the
following parameters:
Mean Time(My) = (Arc Distance)/ (Unit Movement speed)
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Standard Deviation = 0. 10 M^ (a user input)
Dij is computed as follows [ Ref . 19]:
Vf* (U, * A, y
l
*R 0)
Note that Dij is an exponential random variable because it is a multiplicative
factor of an exponential random variable. In equation (1), the result comes from the
detection rate, which is dependent upon the number of sensors (security size), the size of
SOF, and the terrain. The detection process can be represented by the following
sequence of events:
• A unit leaves node i for node j.
• Tjj is drawn from a Normal distribution as described above.
• Dy, an Exponential random variable, is calculated.
• If Dy is less than or equal to T
;j
,
then a detection occurs. IfD
y
is greater than
Tjj, then the transiting unit completes its movement undetected by the enemy.
Using this method, it is possible for a unit to evade detection even under
conditions favorable to the enemy. Conversely, it is possible for a unit to attempt ingress
during darkness, or through other forms of concealment, and still be detected by the
searching force. This reflects the potential events faced by the commander in the field and
is a realistic factor of combat. Using this method, the probability of detection at every
node in an optimal route to the target can be determined.
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Situation detection Rate Situation Detection Rate
(A ,F, L) .1054 (B, M, H) .5108
(A, F, H) .2877 (B, O, L) .4308
(A, M, L) .2231 (B, 0, H) .5978
(A, M, H) .3567 (C, F, L) .5108
(A, 0, L) .3567 (C, F, H) .6931
(A, 0, H) .4308 (C, M, L) .5978
(B, F, L) .2877 (C
,
M, H) .7985
(B, F, H) .4308 (C, 0, L) .6931
(B, M, L) .3567 (C, 0, H) .9163





This model is composed oftwo parts: infiltration and combat based on a Lanchester
attrition process. Aggregated attrition models describe the results of engagements among
aggregated combat units. Since individual combatants are not represented in these units,
details of one-on-one engagements are not simulated; instead the attrition process model
considers average results.
Individual combatants are aggregated into combat units ranging in size from platoons
to divisions. The contributions of the individuals are averaged together over weapon system
classes within the unit. Discrete activities such as fire allocation, target acquisition, and
lethality assessment are aggregated into a single process called attrition. Attrition is also
averaged over periods of time from seconds to hours. The time unit in this model is one
minute. [Ref 6]
The attrition model in this section is a homogeneous model. In a homogeneous
attrition model, combat attrition is assessed against a scaler measure of the unit's combat
power. This scaler measure can be defined as "personnel"; in other cases it is a more abstract
combat power measure. Most homogeneous attrition models determine the amount of
attrition by computing attacker-to-defender force ratios.
B. CONCEPT OF THE ATTRITION MODEL
The attrition process in a large scale aggregated simulation is used to compute combat
outcomes involving small parts of the total force. The attrition process is responsible for
determining what fraction ofweapon systems in the engaged units are within range of enemy
targets, what fraction of the systems acquire enemy targets, and thus what fraction of the
systems in a unit actually participate in the battle.
In this model, the outcomes depend on the characteristics of the target Special forces
are used to support the destruction of the enemy's function in warfare and contribute to the
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conventional warfare strategy. As a result, the target of SOF depends on the main attack
directions for conventional warfare and the commander's intent following the current phase
ofwar. The security level in the target area also changes the outcome of combat. Security
level is distributed from VL (very low) to VH (very high), affecting the engagement and
termination criteria. Simulated battles continue until the SOF can withdraw or the level of
security combat power in the target area reaches a specified threshold.
Figure 4 shows the event process in the target area. If the SOF arrives at the target
without being detected, it can continue infiltrating to destroy the functionality of the strategic
target. In this process, the mission of the SOF team is completely achieved if the SOF team
is not detected (the target strength is reduced to zero), thus impacting on the outcome of the
conventional war. Ifthe SOF team is detected while infiltrating, the combat will proceed to




Figure 4. Decision Tree on Target
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C. INFILTRATION
In the Ingress Model, the detection rate is related to aggregated factors. Different
factors determine whether or not the SOF is detected and engaged in the target area.
Therefore, we model:
Pr (Detect on infiltration) = 1 - exp(-AT) [ 1 ]
where X : detection rate
T : infiltration time
In this model, the time unit is different from that of the Ingress Model, and the detection rate
is determined from another aggregated function as follows:
A = G{ f (SOF size), g (Security size), h (Equipment level) ...}
The detection conditions are aggregated into two factors shown in Table 7. Example
detection rate values for these two major factors are given in Table 8.
SOF Size Security Level
A( small) VL (very low)
B(middle) L (low)
C(large ) M (middle)
H(high)
VH (very high)
Table 7. Two Aggregated Factors on Infiltration
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Situation Detection Rate Situation Detection Rate
( A , VL ) .21 ( B, M ) 1.12
( A , L ) .33 ( B , H ) 1.47
( A , M ) .45 ( B , VH ) 1.83
( A , H ) .57 ( C , VL ) 1.02
( A , VH ) .71 ( C , L ) 1.38
( B , VL ) .58 ( C ,M ) 1.85
( B , L ) .86 ( C , H ) 2.40
( C , VH ) 3.22
Table 8. Detection Rates for the Infiltration Process
D. COMBAT ATTRITION
The development of the attrition model used in this model is based on the work done
by Lanchester. Lanchester - type attrition models refer to the set of differential equations
that describes the change over time in the force levels of combatants and other significant
variables that describe the combat process. [Ref 20, p. 28] The results of combat depend
on what fraction of the target is within range of the SOF's attack, how well organized the C2
( command & control) of the target is, and what fraction of security units actually participate
in the combat. Simulated combat continues until the SOF's withdrawal or achievement of
partial success, based on the SOF's attrition threshold and remaining effectiveness due to
casualties and logistics.
The Lanchester model expresses casualties in terms of force size. Lanchester
differential equation models have gained importance through their ability to provide insight
into the dynamics of combat and their applicability to the entire hierarchy of combat
operations. Further, these differential equation models provide a basis for developing
quantitative insights into combat dynamics. [Ref. 2]
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The concepts are based on the following:
• Force size is a function oftime, and the continuous real time variables x(t) and y(t)
are approximations to the discrete combat units in a real force. So
dX f, v dY , ,
at at
X(t) = size of SOF the time t
Y(t) = size of defense unit at time t
• Attrition of a force is a function of force size and the other possible parameters,
thus,
casualty rate = f (force size, other possible parameters)
Considering the nature of modern weapons and how the concentration of fires could
be achieved, two cases are estimated: aimed fire and area fire. In this model, the SOF is
assumed to know the location of target elements; thus, it uses aimed fire. But even if the
security unit detects the SOF, every element of the securing force does not know the exact
position of all SOF personnel; therefore, area fire is applied. The result is a mixed law for
combat. [Ref 20, pp. 167-170]
dt dt
where Xo = initial size ofX (SOF) force
Y = initial size ofY (security) force
(a,P) depend on the characteristics of weapons and personnel for the SOF and the
security unit.
To determine the possible damage to the target if a SOF force is detected before completing
its mission, the objectives for each force are considered. The security force, defending its
base, may be expected to fight until annihilated (or they reach a breakpoint). The SOF force,
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on the other hand, will seek to withdraw if the level of personnel and equipment remaining
falls below the level at which it can accomplish its mission. The following assumptions are
made:
• The amount oftarget damaged is inversely proportional to the SOF size remaining,
if it wins the engagement. For example, if the SOF has 70% of the force survive
an engagement with the security force, 30% of the intended damage to the target
is accomplished.
• The engagement between the security force and the SOF will continue until the
security force or the SOF reaches their respective breakpoints.
• If the SOF force breaks first, no damage to the target is achieved.
From this process, the following Measure of Effectiveness (MOE) can be compared to
breakpoint thresholds. [Ref: 2]
« - . . Combat power after the engagement
Security force remaining = *- ^_&
Combat power before the engagement
> a
~r\ c Combat power after the engagement , r i lSO force remaining = - si» > b L •> J
Combat power before the engagement
Target damage 1 = 1 - SO force remaining if SOF greater than a
= otherwise
where a: the threshold for the security unit (may be zero)
b. the threshold for the Special Operations Force
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VI. MODEL APPLICATIONS AND ANALYSIS
A. GENERAL
The methodology is applied using three models. First, the target-selection process
generates the optimal target from among the possible targets and the best route to each target
The second model considers the possibility of ingress. On the way to the target, the
conditions along each arc are assumed independent, so the probability of detection is counted
independently at each node, using the factors shown in Table 6. From this detection rate, the
time required to be detected is computed. The difference between transit time and the
detection time realized is used to make the "Go/No Go" decision.
Finally, the Attrition Model consists of the infiltration and combat processes. Upon
arriving at a target, the SOF team infiltrates and executes its mission but the probability of
detection is changed. The detection rate at the target is generally higher than the rate on
ingress. In the combat process, the remaining functionality is estimated by the ratio of attrited
strength to original strength. The results show the effect of SOF in Joint warfare. The
decision logic and issues related to the three models are given in Table 9.
B. RESULTS/ANALYSIS
The three models described in the previous chapter were tested using a notional
Korean war scenario. The results were obtained from the test scenario in Appendix C. The
scenario provided a feasible theater-level conflict situation for the initial test of the models.
The territory of Korea was selected as the basis of the test scenario although it was scaled
down and edited to provide to a workable and unclassified test scenario.
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Kinds of possible target for strategic
objective.
The number of components in these targets




Equipment of SOF for this target
Ways to approach
SOF' s velocity of advance
How to check SOF's advance
(security units)
Factors to block the SOF
(terrain, weather)
Engagement on Infiltration
The Ratio ofCombat power
Distribution of SOF power
Damage to forces involved
Total damage estimate
Analysis of SOF activities
Efficiency of theater-level SOF units
Table 9. Decision Logic and Main Issues on Modeling
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1. Ground Network
Sixty-five nodes and 122 arcs were established for the middle part of the Korean
peninsula. The nodes represent the important features, i.e., main cities on avenues of approach
and significant terrain. Some nodes contain an air base, logistical facility, key terrain,
security, and defense units around the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ). Arcs are based on roads
that can be used as check-points for SOF routes. The arcs which connect the nodes are
assigned the characteristics of the terrain. The arcs are the basis for distance between nodes,
terrain, detection rate, and the time needed to move. The list of arcs and nodes associated
with the 65 node Korean peninsula network is at Appendixes A and B.
2. Application for Target Model
Based on the scenario, SOF goals and objectives in the initial battle were to:
• Destroy all significant power and communication facilities throughout the theater.
• Reduce the effectiveness of tactical airfields at Sowon/Osan.
• Disrupt the C 2 (command & control) of the Field Army Command Post.
• Paralyze the function ofcommand in possible tactical nuclear weapon -containing
area ofUS installation in Korea.
• Disrupt off-loading operation at shipyards, airports in Kimpo.
These goals and possible targets for SOF take the Korean situation into consideration.
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The results of the CARVER matrix used for this example are in Table 10. In this
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Table 10. CARVER Matrix for Objectives
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As the result of this step, seven targets are initially acquired as the actual objectives
for SOF. The location of available SOF units and the nodes in which each strategic target is
located are the input data for Dijkstra's algorithm [Ref 14], which provides an optimal route
for SOF going to the target. The optimal route for attacking each target is:
TGT1 : n3-> nl6-» n31 - n36 -* n48
TGT2: n3-» nl6 —* nl5 - n36
TGT3: n4-> nlO-> nl7-» n33 -> n34
TGT4: n5-> n9 -» n20 - n27 -» n46
TGT 5: n3-> nl4-> nl5-» nl3
TGT6: n3-> nl6-> n31 -» n36 - n48
TGT 7: n3-» nl6-* n31 -» nl7 -» n32
n53
n53
3. Application for Ingress Model
a. Results
A realization of this model was generated in a Quattro Pro spreadsheet using
the @RAND uniform (0, 1) random variable (see Table 1 1). These will be used to generate
random times to detection.
TGT 1 TGT 2 TGT 3 TGT 4 TGT 5 TGT 6 TGT 7
.616242 .628517 .438637 .000705 .800862 .088452 .227944
.896274 .262704 .801132 .86741 .03031 .129744 .208652
.822213 .852173 .436588 .10950 .797058 .243018 .028634
.440744 .586867 .372901 .764904 .570498
.774021 .761593
Table 1 1 . Random Numbers Generated in Quattro-Pro
39
Two times are considered in the Ingress model: the transit time for a unit
going from node i to node j and the simulated time to detect at least one unit going from i
to j. The Ingress model determines detection from the three factors given in Table 5. The
detection time, T„ is compared to the arc travel time. If T
s
is greater than the travel time, the
SOF will not be detected. If shorter, it will be detected and returns to its base, using its
original route with an assumed 20 percent reduction of its combat power.
The SOF team is assumed to move at night in the real world. The actual speed
of movement depends on terrain type, SOF size and level of security. The Ingress model
assumes that the SOF moves 32 km/day in open terrain, 24 km/day in mountain terrain, and
20 km/day in forest terrain. The detection rates are given in Table 6.
b. Analysis
In this model, every arc is independent of the other arcs. Thus, the condition
of an arc that the SOF team previously passed has no effect on latter arcs in the optimal route.
On each arc in the optimal route, the condition ofterrain type, security level, and distance are
different and the movement rate is based on these factors and the size of the team. The larger
size team moves slower than the small team. Therefore, the results are based on a comparison
using real time for movement from node i to node j and simulated detection time based on the
Ingress model.
Tables 12 through 18 are the model results for the optimal routes to Target
1 through Target 7, respectively. If at each arc the Real Time is shorter than the detection
(Sim) time, then the SOF team can traverse that arc without detection. But if it is longer, the
SOF team will be detected and it must go back to its original base. The model assumes that
because the SOF uses its ingress route and has accurate information about that route, it has
only a 20 percent loss of combat power in egress, and the SOF can not be used for other
missions during egress time. Thus, the Red force has a temporary decrease of SOF combat
power during the egress period.
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Arc (n3) nl6 n31 n36 n48 n53
Terrain Type M
Security Level H H L L L













Table 12. Target 1 Data
Arc (n3) nl6 n31 n36
Terrain Type M O
Security Level M L H









Table 13. Target 2 Data
Arc (n4) nlO nl7 n33 n34
Terrain Type M F M M
Security Level H L H L











Table 14. Target 3 Data
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Arc (n3) n9 n20 n27 n46
Terrain Type F F F M
Security Level H H L L











Table 15. Target 4 Data
Arc (n3) nl4 nl5 nl3
Terrain Type M M
Security Level H L L









Table 16. Target 5 Data
Arc (n3) nl6 n31 n36 n48 n53
Terrain Type M
Security Level H L L L H













Table 17. Target 6 Data
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Arc (n3) nl6 n31 nl7 n32
Terrain Type O M O
Security Level H L H L











Table 18. Target 7 Data
Figures 5 through 1 1 show the Posterior Comparison on Time to Targets 1
through 7, respectively.
Target 1

















n 16 n17 n33
Optimal Route
n34
















Figure 9. Posterior Comparison on Time to Target 5
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Target 6




Figure 10. Posterior Comparison on Time to Target 6
Target 7





Figure 1 1 . Posterior Comparison on Time to Target 7
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Analysis for this replication:
Target 1: This is an Air Base objective. The base is necessary for
cooperation between the R.O.K. and the U.S. The optimal route
to attack this target has 5 steps (arcs) from node 3 to node 53 . At
each arc, the real time of the SOF movement is always shorter
than Sim-time Thus, the SOF is not detected enroute to the
objective.
Target 2: This Target is an important government building at node 36, and
requires a large size SOF. The optimal route has three steps.
From Figure 6, the Sim-time is shorter than the real time at two
nodes; therefore, it is detected and will return to base.
Target 3: This is a dam for power and a reservoir for water. This mission
can be done by a small size SOF. From Figure 7, even if the SOF
is small, it will be detected on the first and third arcs; therefore, it
will return to base.
Target 4: This is the Command Post in a C3 facility and needs a large SOF
for the destruction of its function. Figure 8 shows that the SOF
cannot traverse its optimal route without detection.
Target 5: This is an Air-defense Radar site, so it needs a small size SOF, but
from Figure 9 and Table 5, it is likely to be detected by security
force.
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Target 6,7: These targets are an Air Force operational Command Post and the
International Airport. From Figures 10 and 1 1, and Tables 17 and
18, the SOF Commander should adjust his mission and optimal
route entirely if he wants to execute his mission without detection.
In actual application, this model would be run many times to estimate the
probabilities of successful SOF ingress over the optimal routes.
4. Application of the Attrition Model
a. Result ofthe Infiltration Process
The current model applies the simple exponential distribution for the
detection rate of the SOF by the target. This representation of the infiltration process is
relatively simple and produces superficially realistic results. If a target is infiltrated
successfully, the level of its functionality would go to zero because it is assumed that
every undetected SOF team can accomplish its mission perfectly. If the SOF is detected
by security units, the algorithm for combat is activated.
The results ofthe Ingress Model form the starting point for the infiltration
model. From the example of the Korean War scenario and the Ingress Model results
presented above, only target number 1 can be reached without detection. As a result,
target number 1 is used in the infiltration model example to check the binary outcome:
SOF mission success or security unit (combat) engagement.
Recall that






To evaluate P[det], 0.68 is obtained using the @RAND function in Quattro-Pro. For
target 1, the SOF used to attack the AFB is middle sized, and the security level is high.
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Using these data for target number 1, the detection rate of 1.47 is obtained from Table
8. These values were estimated for purposes of this example in units of the total
infiltration time; thus, the infiltration time T
s
is 1.0. Using Equation 4 with T, = 1.0 and
X = 1.47 yields a probability of detection of 0.77. Because 0.68 is less than 0.77, this SOF
unit will be detected while infiltrating to the target and combat will result.
b. Results ofthe Combat Process
In Lanchester's model, the attrition rate is derived from high resolution
combat interactions. Another NPS Master's Thesis is developing a high-resolution model
for the combat between SOF and security forces. In this thesis, an aggregated rate is used
based on the assumption that the SOF is well-trained for this mission, and the security unit
is trained to be on a high alert for the protection of strategic targets. Normally the level
of ability in personnel, information about the target and weapon systems are different
between security units. In this case, the number of personnel in the SOF (1 team =14
people) is 56 (4 teams); the security unit size is assumed to be proportional to the target
size; in this case, 500 is assumed, as are the values for a and p.
a =001 = 1 X = 56 Y
o
= 500
It is assumed that the SOF cannot accomplish its mission if it has less than one third of its
original combat power; the security force will fight until it has only 25% survivors. In the
proposed combat model, the mixed Lanchester model is applied:






From this equation, ifwe assume that the SOF force breaks first,
X,= 56/3 Y, = 418.7
If Y, reaches a breakpoint before X, = VbX
,
then the SOF force will suffer less than 67
percent casualties. However, in this example, the SOF force breaks first, withdrawing from
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the target area. If the SOF had won this combat, reducing the security force to its
breakpoint, the SOF could have proceeded with its mission at its remaining capability level.
But ifthe SOF team was defeated without unacceptable loss to security forces, the SOF's
mission can be treated as a definitive failure. Therefore, at present, the loss to the SOF can
be used to estimate the damage to the target. More detailed analysis of the damage affected
by SOF is pending.
Finally, the damage level of each unit is:
MOE of Target damage = %
MOE of SOF damage = (56 - 56/3 )/56 x 100 = 66.7%
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Vn. SUMMARY AND FUTURE RESEARCH
A. SUMMARY
The purpose of this paper is to develop general methods to depict Special Force
Operations in support of strategic objectives. Three models have been developed to
provide an analytical approach to simulating SOF in theater-level models.
These models represent the initial research and implementation of special force
operations in JWAEP. Although several parts of the model need more refinement and
enhancement, and they are designed specifically for implementation of JWAEP, they still
may be useful in a stand-alone mode or in connection with other models ofjoint warfare.
This approach allows for more realistic investigations of special force operations in the new
world order. It demonstrates priorities among possible targets and the process of selecting
an optimal route in the Targeting model (Model I), the probability of successful SOF ingress
in the Ingress model (Model II) and the probability of infiltration to target and analysis of
potential combat attrition in the Attrition model (Model III). These models are capable of
providing meaningful results in support of analysis ofjoint theater-level operations which
account for uncertainty.
B. FUTURE RESEARCH
There are several parts in this area that need the additional research. Most of these
parts are based on developing an aggregated model of high resolution events; but the high
resolution representation is necessarily the cornerstone to aggregation.
1. Movements Rates for Each Size
The rate of movement at each unit is different. Generally, the smaller the size of
SOF, the faster it goes. Because the data should be also updated by changes of weapons
and SOF skill levels, the movement process needs more specific study based on a high
resolution model.
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2. Detection Over Multiple Arcs
The effect of security units was considered in the selection of arcs which the SOF
used for its route. The security unit detection rate was aggregated and combined with other
factors. As sensor systems develop, it may be possible for the sensors of a security unit to
reach out over two or three arcs in the optimal route. This situation should be considered
in a higher resolution model.
3. The Coefficient of Attrition Rate
This coefficient was estimated from historical data, based on the ability of SOF and
security units and each weapon system; therefore, its value can be adjusted by new data.
In this era of high technology, the capacity of SOF weapon systems increases, and the
ability of a SOF team must be updated. The coefficient of attrition rate should be adjusted
to incorporate the updated data.
4. Implementation of these Models into JWAEP
At present the network in JWAEP is limited to the arcs and nodes used by large
units in aggregated combat. The initial model's network of 65 nodes and 132 arc for the
Phase I in Korean War will need to be added to JWAEP. A larger SOF network is needed
to represent the whole territory ofKorea in JWAEP.
5. Damage to the Target
At present, the residual SOF force size is used as an estimator of partial SOF
mission success. In reality, the damage to the target will be a random function based upon
the size, equipment, training, etc. of the SOF and security forces; the time available to the
SOF before detection, and the actual vulnerability of the target. Higher resolution models
(under development elsewhere) may provide the necessary data to improve upon the target
damage model outlined in this thesis.
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APPENDIX A. LIST OF NODES FOR SOF NETWORK
node node
number Key points number Key points
1 Pyong Yang 34 Yang Seo - Ri
2 Ongjin 35 Seoul
3 Kaesong 36 Kwacheon
4 Pyonggang 37 Incheon
5 Mt. Kumkang 38 Yangpyong
6 Kansong 39 Kwang Ju
7 Mt. Daeam 40 Hajinbu
8 Mt. DaeSung 41 Mt. Balwang
9 Hwacheon 42 Mt. Karlwang
10 Chorwon 43 Saemal
11 Yeoncheon 44 Mt. Baedug
12 Hantan River 45 Mt. Chiock
13 Dongducheon 46 Won Ju
14 Munsan 47 Ansan
15 Bupwon Ri 48 Suwon
16 Kumcheon 49 Icheon
17 Rocheon 50 YeoJu
18 Kapyong 51 Nam Yang
19 Yanggu 52 Yongtn
20 Chuncheon 53 Osan
21 InJe 54 Samchuck
22 Sokcho 55 Sabook
23 Yangyang 56 Young Wae
24 Chumun Jin 57 Chechon
25 Mt. Ohdae 58 Kamgock
26 Kangnung 59 Joam
27 Hongcheon 60 Songtan
28 Mt. Gyebang 61 Ansung
29 Castle Taegie 62 Yeopyongdo
30 Uijongbu 63 Dogjukdo
31 Koyang 64 Nacsan Sea




APPENDIX B. ARC ATTRIBUTES AND LIST
A. ARC ATTRIBUTES
The route for SOF contains check-points for the force to maintain its route without
error. Thus, the check-points are geographical features, which can be included as nodes.
In this network for SOF, Arcs are drawn parallel to conventional mobility corridors, relative
to mountains and cities, which are the nodes.
1. Distance
The distance of the arc between nodes is measured in kilometers, based on the
contours of the terrain, the roads, and the arc direction.
2. Terrain
The attributes for terrain are classified into three categories: open, mountain, and
forested area. This is based on the dominant factors in the area.
• open area * O
• mountain area . . . M
• Forest area F
*water is classified as open area.
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B. LIST OF ARCS
Arc Number
'
\rc distance fknri Terrain Comment





4 3 - 14 33 DMZ
5 3 - 16 40 DMZ
6 4 - 8 39 M DMZ
7 4 - 10 42 M DMZ
8 4 - 11 41 M DMZ
9 5 - 7 30 M DMZ
10 5 - 9 35 F DMZ
Security
Arc Number Arc distance Ckm) Terrain Unit
11 6-•22 30 R
12 6-•64
13 6-•65
14 7- 19 21 M D
15 7-
.21 17 M R
16 8 - 9 26 M R
17 8- 10 30
18 8- 18 55 M D
19 9- 18 40 M R
20 9- 20 29 F
21 10- 17 35 F R
22 11 - 12 16 M BN
23 12- 13 14 M BN
24 12- 14 36 M
25 13- 15 22 M 2BN
26 13- 17 15 F R
27 13 - 30 24 M
28 14- 15 10 M R




































Arc Number Arc distance (km) Terrain Unit
30 15-16 15 M R
31 15-30 25 F R




























60 29-46 48 M BN
61 30-31 22 M D
















Arc Number Arc distance (km) Terrain Unit
63 30-•35 24 Co
64 31 •32 17 R
65 31 •35 22 0,M BN
66 31 •36 38 0,F Co
67 32-•35 30 0,M Co
68 32-•37 23 PT
69 33-•34 18 M
70 33-•35 25 Co
71 33-•36 38 0,M
72 34.38 20 0,M R
73 34-39 20
74 35 -36 13 R
75 35 37 41 D
76 35 -39 32 2R
77 36 -39 30 0,M Co
78 36 -47 25 BN







































96 45-46 4 O BN
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APPENDIX C. NETWORK FOR SOF
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APPENDIX D. TEST SCENARIO (FOR POSSIBLE KOREAN WAR)
A. THE PURPOSE OF THE TEST SCENARIO
The purpose of the test scenario is to provide a feasible theater-level conflict
scenario for the initial test of the three models. A Major Regional Contingency (MRC),
recognized by military planners as a potential conflict, will be used in testing the model.
The Korean MRC serves as the premise of the test scenario, though it was both scaled
down and edited to provide a workable and unclassified test scenario.
Three possible attack courses of action (COA) that may be staged by the forces of
North Korea, commonly termed the Democratic People's Republic ofKorea (DPRK), were
formulated. Three corresponding response COAs were designed for Allied forces. The
purpose of designing three COAs is to ensure that targets are weighted by the COA being
pursued and the commander's intent.
B. GROUND ARC-NODE NETWORK
The 65-node network for the Phase I of the Korean peninsula has 122 land arcs.
The nodes primarily represent prominent cities located at intersection of avenues of
approach, key terrains and lines of communication. Some nodes contain key terrain, air
bases, logistical bases, defensive battle positions, assembly areas, and terrain oriented
objectives. The network also extends into the adjacent bodies of water surrounding the
peninsula to facilitate naval air and SOF needs. A complete list of nodes and their locations
is found in Appendix A.
Chapter IV contains the complete discussion of attributes of the arcs (transit nodes)
in the network. A list of the arcs associated with the 65-node Korean peninsula network




The test scenario is based on events in the Korean theater of operations and is
designed to be somewhat realistic. The force structures and operational plans for both sides
of the conflict have been designed using force sizes, identifications, locations, plans, and
missions that are plausible yet purposely incorrect, in order for this study to remain
unclassified.
2. Terrain Description
The Korean peninsula is contiguous to both the former Soviet Union and China and
stretches roughly 1000 kilometers south of the Asian continental land mass. Fifty-five
percent of the 221,487 square kilometers is north of the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ). The
DMZ is four kilometers wide and extends 24 1 kilometers from the Yellow Sea in the west
to the Sea of Japan in the east.
The terrain of South Korea (ROK) is diverse with great mountain ranges in the east
and many river basins in the west and central portions of the country. Two of the greatest
mountain ranges are the Taebaek Range, running north-south along the eastern coast line,
and the intersecting Sobaek Range, which runs roughly northeast-southwest in the central
region of the land mass. These two mountain ranges, along with the Nangnimsan Range,
divide the country's eastern and western sides. Running north from the vicinity ofMasan
along the southeast coast is the Naktong Basin which provides flat to rolling terrain. The
entire western portion of the country is a succession of basins, with the exception of the
Haryong Mountain Range, creating a large mobility corridor extending north-south.
As discussed above, the country is divided by the north-south mountain ranges.
Along the eastern coast line is a very narrow mobility corridor that reaches the southern
most point of the peninsula from the DMZ. The entire western region of South Korea is
essentially a mobility corridor expanding south from the DMZ, through Seoul and Chonju,
to Kwangju in the southwest.
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Smaller noteworthy mobility corridors cross the specific terrain along the DMZ.
In the east is the narrow corridor along the coast. In the west there are three notable
corridors extending south into Seoul and the surrounding lowlands. First, to the far west
is a path from Kaesong crossing the DMZ. Second, adjacent to the east, is a corridor
through the North Korean town of Pyongyang stretching to Seoul, and third, in the center
ofthe DMZ, is a mobility corridor through Kimhwa in the north extending into the vicinity
of Seoul.
3. DPRK Force Structure
The DPRK ground forces are comprised ofboth conventional and special operations
forces. The conventional forces are formed into four corps organizations, totaling 1 6 corps.
The four different corps organizations are comprised of two versions of relatively balanced
numbers of armored and mechanized infantry brigades and two versions of light infantry
units. Twenty-one 1000 man battalions make up the entirety of the special operations
forces (SOF).
The DPRK aviation assets are comprised of 50 MI-24 FUND helicopters and 25
regiments of combat fixed-wing aircraft. There are 12 fighter air attack regiments of 376
aircraft, one half of which are versions of the Soviet MIG. Ten fighter ground attack
regiments have 346 aircraft, the majority ofwhich are quite antiquated. Finally, there are
three light bomber regiments with 80 aircraft.
The DPRK Naval assets are inconsequential relative to ours. The preponderance
of naval forces will be used in support ofDPRK SOF operations.
4. Allied Force Structure
The Allied forces are comprised of United States (US) and Republic of Korea
(ROK) units. The US forces are organized by service and specific unit designation. There
is an additional descriptor that categorizes the US units. The US contingent is broken down
into Initial Forces (IF) and Reinforcing Forces (RF). Initial Forces are those that Allied
planners deem necessary to conduct a successful defense of the Korean peninsula while
Reinforcing Forces are those that make up the significant difference in the force structure
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allowing for counter-offensive operations. The ROK Army will field ten divisions and 1
5
separate brigades. Two US mechanized brigades (stationed in South Korea) will join ten
armor brigades and four mechanized brigades from among the 1 5 separate ROK brigades
to form the ROK Corps responsible for counter-offensive operations.
The US Initial Forces are comprised of units from all four services with both
conventional and special operations forces. Four divisions and an armored cavalry regiment
make up the Army contingent while the Air Force furnishes 16 squadrons, six bomber and
ten fighter. Two carrier battle groups (CVBG) from the Navy will join four Marine
Expeditionary Brigades and a Marine Expeditionary Unit. Lastly, the Army, Navy and Air
Force will provide special operations forces.
The US Reinforcing Forces have two Army divisions, 15 Air Force fighter
squadrons, and two carrier battle groups. [Ref 16]
5. Engagement Conventional Goals and Objectives for Complete




Envelopment and partial destruction of Seoul
2. Seize Objective (OBJ) Suwon-Osan (airfields)
3 Seize OBJ Kangnung
4. Destruction of forces north of Phase Line 1 (PL1)
b. Phase II
1 Seize OBJ Chungju (road junctions)
2. Seize OBJ Kongju-Taeju (road junctions)
3. Seize OBJ Kunsan (air/sea ports)
4. Seize OBJ Yeongdeog (road junctions)





Seize OBJ Kimchun-Taegu (road junctions)
2. Seize OBJ Kwangju (airport/C2/Logistics)
3. Seize OBJs Pusan and Pohang (sea ports)
4. Destruction of all Allied forces on the peninsula
6. SOF Goals and Objectives
a. Destroy all significant power and communication facilities throughout the
theater.
b. Reduce effectiveness of airfields at Suwon and Osan.
c. Reduce effectiveness of airfields and sea ports at Kunsan.
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